In 1965, E. M. Gold and H. Putnam observed independently that recursive operators can be viewed as mechanical scientists trying to investigate a given hypothesis in the limit [1] , [12] . Gold then essentially characterized the hypotheses that mechanical scientists can successfully decide in the limit in terms of arithmetic complexity. These ideas were developed still further by Peter Kugel [4] . In this paper, I extend this approach to obtain characterizations of identification in the limit, identification with bounded mind-changes, and identification in the short run, both for computers and for ideal agents with unbounded computational abilities. The characterization of identification with n mind-changes entails, as a corollary, an exact arithmetic characterization of Putnam's n-trial predicates, which closes a gap of a factor of two in Putnam's original characterization [12] .
The learning-theoretic interpretation of the apparatus of the theory of recursive operators has some pedagogical advantages. For example, it will be shown how the recursion-theoretic basis theorems answer questions about how the difficulty of empirical science relates to the computational difficulty of the theory under investigation. The learning-theoretic interpretation of recursion theory also raises questions about the status of classical results (such as the basis theorems) under changes in background knowledge.
Data Presentations, Hypotheses, and Background Knowledge
I assume that the total evidence received by the scientist at a given time can be encoded effectively by a natural number. The data presentation received by an empirical scientist is potentially infinite, so a data presentation is as an co-sequence of natural numbers. Hypotheses will also be viewed as discrete objects effectively encoded by natural numbers.
There are many features that scientists would like their hypotheses to have, including simplicity, unity, empirical adequacy, and so forth. To avoid interminable debates about the precise nature of these requirements, we will assume only that there is some well-defined relation A c co® X co of hypothesis adequacy holding between data presentations and code numbers of hypotheses.
Since the aim of inquiry will be to determine whether a hypothesis is adequate, we may identify a hypothesis with the set H of all infinite data presentations for which it is adequate. So a hypothesis \s just some arbitrary subset of co 03 . Let x H (t) be the characteristic function of H.
Background knowledge restricts the scientist's a priori'uncertainty about the data presentation he will ultimately see in the limit. So we may also think of background knowledge K as some arbitrary subset of co 03 .
Paradigms of Hypothesis Assessment
A problem of hypothesis assessment is a situation in which a scientist is given a hypothesis and is asked to assess its adequacy on the basis of increasing data fed from some infinite data presentation. Let co* be the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers, which we will think of as finite sequences of observations. An assessment method is a function that takes a finite data segment to some guess about the adequacy of the hypothesis in question. The guess 1 means that the hypothesis in question is adequate, 0 means that it is not, and # represents a refusal to produce a judgment of adequacy. Now we will consider a sequence of increasingly lenient notions of reliable success for hypothesis assessment methods.
<t > verifies H over K in the limits
Vt e K A(t, i) »(3n Vm > n 0(t|m)« 1).
<} > refutes H over K In the limit** Vt€ K-iA(t,i)»(3nVm>n 0 where mc(<t>, t|0) = 0 and mc(0 f t|n+i) = mc(<t)(t|n)) if <)>(t|n) = <Mt|n+1) and mc(<t>, t|n+1) = mc(^>(t|n)) + 1 otherwise.
<t > verifies H overK with certainty <=>
Vt e K f t € H <=> (3n s.t. <Kt|n) = 1 and Vm < n, <|>(t|n) = #).
<( > refutes H over Kwith certainty «
Vt e K, t e H »(3n s.t. <f>(t|n) = 0 and Vm < n, <(>(t|n) = #). The finite Borel hierarchy is defined as follows 1 , where R is assumed to be of type <k, j>.
R e 1^ « R is clopen.
R e I^ » 3P e sS s.t.
(1) P is type <k, j+1> and (2) R = {<t, x> e (af) k X col: 3n e co s.t. -«P(t, x, n)},
Re An »Re
Now we proceed to define the arithmetic hierarchy. Let R be a relation of type <k, j>. Turing machine M is a decision procedure for R over K <=> Vt € K k , Vx e col if R(t, x) then M halts with 1
after receiving x as input and after scanning some finite segment of each t occurring in t, and M halts with 0 otherwise. R is recursive <=> R has some decision procedure. The arithmetic hierarchy starts out with recursive rather than arbitrary, clopen relations:
R €!?<=> R is recursive.. Proof: The effective parts of (c) and (d) are established in [1] , and the effective part of (c) is shown in [12] . The ineffective cases follow by the same arguments with references to computability suppressed, (a) and (b) are trivial. M
Some Applications

1: The Empirical Irony of Cognitive Science
Cognitive scientists frequently assume that human behavior can be modelled by a computer.
Some philosophers have challenged this assumption on a priori grounds. Let us approach the question empirically, rather than dogmatically. Imagine a given system emitting a sequence of outputs, and consider the hypothesis H rec , that the system will produce a recursive sequence. scientists cannot verify the non-computability of human nature in the limit either, because no system could, ideal or otherwise.
2: Basis Theorems and Hypothesis Complexity
A complete hypothesis specifies everything that will ever be seen, in the correct order. Hence, a complete hypothesis is a singleton {t}. In logic, the arithmetic complexity of {t} is known as the implicit complexity of t and the arithmetic complexity of t (viewed as a set of ordered pairs) is known as the explicit complexity of t. From a learning theoretic perspective, the implicit complexity of t is just the complexity of investigating the complete hypothesis {t}, whereas the explicit complexity of t is just the computational difficulty of generating the nth prediction specified by t.
Since science is often conceived of as a process of deductively checking the consequences of a theory against the observed data, a natural question is: how much worse than the empirical complexity of a hypothesis can its deductive complexity be if a computable scientist is to determine whether it is correct? More specifically, how impossible can it be to derive predictions from h before it becomes impossible to verify h in the limit, or to refute h with certainty? It turns out that the basis theorems of mathematical logic already provide surprising answers to this question in many cases.
The first result is intuitive: if an effective scientist is to refute a theory making only finitely many different kinds of predictions, then there must be a mechanical procedure for deriving each successive prediction entailed by the theory, so that these predictions may be compared against the data.
Theorem 4.2.1: If {t} is effectively refutable with certainty and rng(t) is finite then t is recursive.
Proof: [3, p. 79] and Theorem 3. T his intuitive picture may be extended to the case of verifiability in the limit, so long as the theory in question makes only finitely many different kinds of predictions.
Theorem 4.2.2:
If {t} is effectively verifiable in the limit and mg(t) £ {1, 0} then t is recursive. it does not follow the intuitive method of checking successive predictions of a theory against the data. This startling result is softened somewhat by the fact that the "magic" method that succeeds
will not notice immediately that {t} has been refuted, whereas an ineffective method that can magically deduce predictions from {t} would notice right away. To see this, say that H Is consistent with a e co* over K<=>KnHnB a *0. 
<t > is vigilant about
Fact 4.2.4:
If 0 is recursive and 0 is vigilant about {t} over K and 0 refutes {t} with certainty over K then t is recursive.
Proof: Let 0 be as required. To compute t, we proceed as follows on input n: Stage 0: run 0(<O>), <t>(<1>),... until some <m> is found on which 0 does not return 0. Since 0 is vigilant, t(0) = 
Characterizations of Hypothesis Assessment with Bounded Mind-Changes
It remains to characterize empirical decidability with n mind-changes. Putnam [12] discusses a ctosely related notion under the rubric of n-frta/ predicates, but his characterization leaves a gap of a factor of two between its upper and tower bounds. 2 I will present an exact characterization in terms of the difference hierarchy*, a finitary version of the Borel and Arithmetic hierarchies.
The topological version will be indexed with MC and the computational version will be indexed with me, for "mind-changes".
Re zl^ <=>RisofformS nO, whereSe zjj 10 and O is open.
MC= U AjT n € co
The only difference between the me hierarchy and the MC hierarchy is that we replace open sets with RE sets in the second clause of the definition:
ReX^ »RisofformS nO.whereSe iS*andOis RE.
The MC hierarchy can be verified to satisfy the following closure laws:
Let O be open and let C be closed. and similarly for the me hierarchy when O is RE and C is Co-RE.
• Now it is possible to characterize empirical decidability with at most n mind-changes. 
Proof: (a) => Suppose that [recursive] <( > decides H over K in n mind-changes starting with 0.
Define O(t, n) » mc(<|>, t) > n and define C(t, n) <=> mc(<t>, t) < n.
, First, let's consider the case when n is even. Then since 0 always starts with conjecture 0 and never uses more than n mind-changes over K, we have:
Vt e K, t e H « 0 changes its mind some odd number of times < n-1 <=> \\\ V #0(t) = 2k|v#0(t)>n+1l, if n is odd P n is readily seen to be effectively decidable in n mind-changes starting with 0. A simple diagonal argument shows that P n cannot be decided with fewer mind-changes starting with 0. Now apply Theorem 5.2.
(a) Let P n be defined as in the proof of (b). Define P(t) <=> P t1 (t). Let 4> and n be given. Define ti = n+1, and now force $ to change its mind concerning P at least n+1 times, as in (b). So by theorem S c co is an n-frfa/ predicate <=> there is some total recursive f such that for each n e co, H *s( n ) with at most n mind-changes. The demon leads the scientist down the bold path until <t > says 1 (which must happen, else the demon stays with the bold path and 0 fails in the limit). As soon as 0 says 1, the demon proceeds up the next available path for H. Now 0 must eventually say 0, at which time the demon veers to the right down the next available path for H.
5.2, P is not in any i^4
K may be thought of as an infinite 'feather whose "shaft" is the bold path, and whose alternating "barbs" are the other paths. We may define feathers more generally as follows:
K Is a 1 -feather forH with shaft t <=> t € K n H.
K is an n+1 -feather for H with shaft t » t e K n H and Vn 3t € K s.t. t|n = r|n and _ K is an n-feather with shaft t for H K is an n-feather for H c=> 3t s.t. K is an n-feather for H with shaft t.
n-feathers for H
We may now define the feather dimension of K for H: D//HH(K) = n <=> K is an n-feather for H and K is not an n+1 -feather for H. 
Paradigms of Discovery
In problems of hypothesis assessment, the scientist is assigned some hypothesis whose adequacy is to be investigated on the basis of increasing data. In discovery problems, the scientist is required to invent an adequate hypothesis on the basis of increasing data. Most results in learning theory concern discovery rather than assessment. Interest has centered on grammatical inference, recursive function identification, and the induction of first-order theories from presentations of structure diagrams. Each of these applications is a special case of the following setting.
Hypothesis assessment methods do not have to read or to produce hypotheses, so hypotheses could be viewed abstractly as uncountable sets of infinite sequences. This will not do when discovery procedures are computers. Instead, we will assume simply that hypotheses are stated in a discrete, finitary language with a decidable syntax. Hence, hypotheses, like data sentences, may encoded by natural numbers. As before, we will assume that the goal of inquiry is some relation of adequacy A c co® X co holding between infinite data presentations and hypotheses. A may entail consistency with the total data, explanatory completeness over the total data, simplicity, unity, or any other desideratum that depends only upon the hypothesis and the total data. We will A discovery method will be a map from finite segments of data presentations to hypotheses, i.e. co* -> co. We will consider the following concepts of successful discovery:
$ identifies PK-adequate hypotheses over K with certainty » Vt e K 3n s.t. A(t, <t>(t|n)) and Vm < n, <j>(t|n) = #.
<) > identifies A-adequate hypotheses in n mind-changes <=> Vt e K 3n e co Vm > n, <t>(t|m) = 5C H (t) and mc(<t>, t) < n.
<t > identifies A-adequate hypotheses overK in the limit <=> Vt e K 3n Vm > n 0(t|m) = <|>(t|n) & A(t, 0(t|n).
A-adequate hypotheses are [effectively] identifiable over K "with certainty 1 with n mind changes . in the limit
[total recursive] <j > s.t. <$> identifies A-adequate hypotheses over K
["with certainty 1 with n mind changes L in the limit J
Characterizations of Reliable Discovery
Each of these senses of success requires that an adequate hypotheses be found for each data presentation in K. It is therefore trivial that A must cover K in the following sense if success is to be possible.
A covers K& Vt € K 3i e co s.t. A(t, i).
Now we may characterize identification with certainty and identification in the limit. n, m), we also have that A'(t, (x)2). and hence that A(t, (x)2), as required. The ineffective case is similar, with references to computation omitted. •
Learning Theory Results as Relative Complexity Classifications
The following examples illustrate how the standard paradigms of language leamability and function identification drop out as special cases of the approach adopted here. From our perspective, standard results in learning theory may be thought of as strong relative complexity classifications for relations of type co" X co.
Function Identification:
The problem of identifying set Rec of total recursive functions:
Adequacy relation: Af un (t, i) » <| >j = t
Background knowledge: K c Rec
One of the first negative results about function identification is that the collection of all recursive functions is identifiable in the limit, but not effectively so. The positive result follows from the fact B, Rec B, Rec that Af un (t, i) <=> ft = t <=> Vn 0j(n) = t n . Since the relation ^(n) = t n is A i , Af un € n i . The situation is different in the computable case: Af un (t, i) «=> <t >i = t <=> Vn <|>j (n) = t n » Vn 3k <t>j(n)it n .
Gold's negative result together with Theorem 10 tells us that this characterization is optimal, i.e. Language Identification by RE index:
The problem of identifying language class L e RE:
Adequacy relation: ARE(t, i) » Wj = rng(t)
Background knowledge: K[_ = {t: 3S e L s.t. rng(t) = S}.
Here, the basic theorem is that no collection of languages L' containing all finite languages and one infinite language is identifiable in the limit, even by an ineffective learner [11] . In our generaOzed notation, this is the claim that ARE hypotheses are not identifiable over Kf, which 3k Vk' > k Vn fo(n)!I« n e mg(t|k')J e zj Ku ".
Language Identification by recursive index:
The problem of identifying language class L Q RE:
Adequacy relation: A R (t, i) <* ft « Xrng(t)
Background knowledge: K| _ = {t: 3S G L s.t. rng(t) = S}.
Let L* be as in the last example. Gold showed that L' is not identifiable by an effective learner even when the data presentations are assumed to be primitive recursive. Let Prim be the set of all primitive recursive sequences. Let K 1 = K(j n Prim. Then Gold's result shows that there is no A c Proof. Define A(t, i)« 0 occurs in t at least i times, and let K = uP. Evidently, A e £1 = sT. But a simple diagonal argument permits us to fool an arbitrary discovery method an arbitrary number of times. B
The problem is that discovery depends not only on the topology of each hypothesis, but also on how the data presentations for different hypotheses are interleaved together. This interleaved structure of the adequacy relation can be captured exactly if we generalize the notion of nfeathers slightly.
K Is a 1 -feather fori mod A with shaft \^>\e KnAj.
K to an n+1 -feather for i mod A with shaft t <=> t € K n Aj and Vn3t f 6 K3ke co s.t. t|n = t'|n and K is an n-feather with shaft t for K mod A with shaft f, and t 1 e A|<.
K to an n-feather fort mod A <=> 3t s.t. K is an n-feather for i mod A with shaft t.
K is an exact n-feather for i mod A <=> K is an n-feather for i mod A and Vm > n, K is not an m-feather for i mod A.
Theorem 9.1:
A-adequate hypotheses are identifiable over K in n mind-changes starting with # » Vi, K is not an n-feather for i.
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.1. B Example: Recall the case of learning finite languages by RE index. It is easy to see that ^Un is an n-feather for ARE for each n, so the finite languages are not identifiable under any bounded number of mind changes.
Conclusion
24
Complete characterizations have been presented for effective and ineffective hypothesis assessment, in the short run, in the long run, and with bounded mind changes. Complete characterizations have also been presented for effective and ineffective discovery in the limit, and for non-effective discovery with bounded mind-changes. It remains to characterize effective discovery with bounded mind changes.
